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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

TAXATION
Allocation of Income of Unincorporated Businesses Operating Both Within
and Wt-fhout the State
Under section 386-g of the Tax Law an unincorporated firm carrying on
business both within and without the state is entitled to allocate its income in
computing the unincorporated business tax. When one partnership receives a
share of the income of another partnership the receiving partnership must prove
that it carries on its own business outside the state to be permir.ed to allocate
income.' The fact that the remitting partnership carries on business without the
state is irrelevant, because the two partnerships are separate taxable entities.
The New York firm in Young v. Bragalini2 contended that it was entitled
to allocate its income, on the ground that it carried on business outside of the
state through properly licensed and authorized local agents, consisting of a
Texas partnership and a Brazilian organization. The Tax Commission asserted
that since the New York partnership was not licensed to engage in business in
the foreign jurisdictions its business could have been conducted only in New
York, and therefore all of its income was earned within New York.'
The evidence showed that the three firms were engaged in the insurance
business. The Houston office never acted independently of New York in dealing
with their major client and from "time to time" partners and employees of
New York worked on this account in Houston. Both firms always described
themselves as having offices in New York and Houston and acted in conjunction
with each other. A Houston partner said they considered themselves to be an
agent of the New York firm. However, the Texas and Biaziiian companies
delivered the insurance policies, billed the insured, and collected the payments
in their own names.
The Appellate. Division unanimously upheld the Tax Commission and the
Court of Appeals affirmed (4-3). The majority reasoned that since the New
York firm was unlicensed in Texas and Brazil it had no power to make a
contract of any kind in those jurisdictions, and as it could not delegate a power
it did not have, the claim of carrying on business in the foreign jurisdictions
could not be sustained. The dissenters were of the opinion that licensing of the
principal was not a prerequisite to a valid agency relationship.
The majority refused to recognize an agency relationship for New York
taxing purposes on the ground that it was not recognized by another jurisdiction
1. Cromwell v. Bates, 284 App. Div. 1001, 135 N.Y.S.2d 534 (3rd Dep't 1954).
2. 3 N.Y.2d 602, 170 N.Y.S.2d 805 (1958).
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for regulatory purposes. It assumed that because the firm could not carry on
business in other jurisdictions directly, it necessarily could not do so through
validly licensed agents. Whether this conclusion is required by the foreign
licensing laws in question was not shown.
Since the majority relied heavily upon the proposition that the burden of
proof is upon the taxpayer to overcome assessments and that determinations of
the Tax Commission are to be set aside only if clearly erroneous, the present
case does not seem to constitute overwhelming authority against future taxpayers'
contentions of this nature. If the taxpayer can dearly establish that the licensing
requirements of a foreign jurisdiction, although prohibiting a business from
operating directly therein, do not preclude a valid agency relationship in which
only the agent is licensed, this case should not foreclose the allocation of income.
Taxation of Real Property Leased by the United States to Individuals
In Fort Hamilton Manor v. Boyland3 the taxpayers leased land, located in
New York State, from the federal government and erected housing projects
thereon. Under the terms of the lease the improvements were to remain the property of the lessee, but if not removed at the end of the lease were to become the
property of the lessor.
The Tax Commission of the City of New York attempted to tax the
leasehold interest of appellants. The Supreme Court sustained the determination
of the Tax Commission, the Appellate Division affirmed, -and the Court of
Appeals unanimously reversed.
Congress has declared that when real property owned by the federal government is leased to pri ate interests the lessee's interest in the property is subject
to state taxation. 4 While the federal government permits taxation of such a
leasehold interest, however, under New York law only real property is taxed and
the interest of a tenant in real estate under lease is not deemed to be real
property, but rather a chattel real which is personal property.5 It can be taxed as
real property only if the lessee has an enforceable option to acquire the real property, on the theory that the lessee is the beneficial owner with the government merely
holding the bare legal title.6 In the instant case appellants had no option to
3. Fort Hamilton Manor v. Boyland, 4 N.Y.2d 192, 173 N.Y.S.2d 560 (1958).
4. Act of Aug. 5, 1947, ch. 493 §6, 61 STAT. 775 (now 10 U.S.C. §2667(e)
Supp. V, 1958).
5. People ex rel. Higgins v. McAdam, 84 N.Y. 287 (1881); Matter of Althause's Estate, 63 App. Div. 252, 71 N.Y. Supp. 445 (1st Dep't 1901), aff'd 168
N.Y. 670, 61 N.E. 1127 (1901); Fifth Ave. Bldg. Co. v. Kernochan 221 N.Y. 370,
117 N.E. 579 (1917); First Trust and Deposit Co. v. Syrdelco, Inc., 249 App.Div.
285, 292 N.Y.Supp. 206 (4th Dep't 1936).
6. Grumman Aircraft Eng. Corp. v. Board of Assessors, 2 N.Y.2d 500, 161
N.Y.S.2d 393 (1957).

